Outer Space is regulated under public international law through a relatively small number of international treaties adopted during the early years of the Space Age. The most important of these is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies^[1]), which sets out the basic prinicples governing activites in Outer Space, including the freedom of exploration and use, the prohibition of national appropriation, and the responsibility of States for space activities carried out under their jurisdiction. These general principles are further developed in serveral more specialized agreements, including treaties on liability for damage caused by space objects and on the registration of objects launched into outer space. Although this legal framework remains formally in force, it was created at a time when space activities were conducted almost exclusively by States. Today, the growing involvement of private actors and commercial operators places increasing pressure on mechanisms such as registration and transparency, which play a key role in maintaining accountability under the existing system.^[2]

Since 1976, when the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention) entered into force, nations were and still are trying to find the best way to create a universal procedure for registering objects launched into Outer Space. While the United Nations provides a general list of objects launched into Outer Space, the key information on particular objects is still missing. Moreover, the UNOOSA data indicates that roughly 88-90% of space objects have been registered, which clearly leaves us with 10-12% of objects that are missing and may complicate identification and attribution^[3].

However, why are we even interested in just ten percent out of all the objects launched into Outer Space? According to Article II of the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, a “launching State” is absolutely liable for damage caused by its object on the surface of the earth or to an aircraft flight^[4]. Not having the launching State properly register the object, thus this object being in the 10-12% of unregistered space objects, creates a chance of liability omission by the launching state, as it may turn out impossible to identify the state that launched the object that caused damage. Think of the issue as you would be thinking about a domestic airplane that is flying unregistered, without the list of passengers. How would anyone be able to identify the passengers, how would they track the flight without it having followed the proper registration procedures prior to departure?^[5]

Although the United Nations has maintained a register of objects launched into outer space since 1962^[6], the lack of a universal registration practice remains an issue for national needs. Facing the issue, the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs prepared a toolkit to support nations by providing harmonized international registration practices^[7]. The “Toolkit on Good Registration Practices” establishes a general practice observed in nations from all over the world. The Registration Convention, after the most recent accession of Malaysia, has 78 states that ratified it and are obliged to maintain a registry of objects launched into outer space^[8]. What is, however, important to note, is what was mentioned by the UNOOSA itself; States do not have to be State Parties to the Registration Convention to establish a registry of objects launched into outer space^[9]. Although only States Parties to the Registration Convetion remain obliged to maintain a national registry, some States that are not parties to the Convention have nonetheless established their own national registries in order to compile information on space objects that fall under their national jurisdiction^[10].

The key issue is how, or if states are able to close the ten percent gap to make sure that we are able to track all the objects launched into outer space. As launch costs fall, non-traditional actors (universities, schools, startups) are able to deploy satellites, which often operate outside traditional governmental space infrastructures that were built for a handful national satellites. Plenty of foreign private entities (f.e. universities^[11]) launch objects via U.S. companies like SpaceX^[12]; the U.S. government must then determine if the object should be registered by them, or if they are expecting the originating state to register it.^[13] The Toolkit is the most recent effort to harmonize and update registration practices.

To even make an attempt to get to the core of the issue, we must gain the understanding of what a launching state is. This concept is central to international space law because it determines which State is legally responsible for registration, and thus which State bears international liability for damage under the Liability Convention. Referring to the Registration Convention, Article I defines “launching State” as (1) a State which launches or procures the launching of a space object and (2) a State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched^[14]. In theory, this definition creates a comprehensive jurisdictional net. In practice, however, it frequently leads to overlapping designations and conflicting interpretations. For example, a single mission may involve a satellite manufactured in one country, owned by a company incorporated in another, integrated in a third, and launched by a private provider from a fourth State’s territory. In such cases, multiple States may satisfy the treaty definition, yet none may take responsibility for registering the object or accepting liability for damage. The result is a growing gap between treaty obligations and contemporary space operations.^[15]

Launch brokers and rideshare companies make things even more complicated; sometimes the payload owner never interacts with the launch provider directly. Even hosted payloads, where an instrument rides on a satellite owned by someone else, raise their own questions. Is the payload registered with the main satellite? Does it need its own entry? There is no universal state practice on this. And for launches taking place from leased or commercially operated facilities, it is not always obvious how the territory or facility requirements should be applied. The ambiguity in the definition of launching State is part of the structural reason we still see that unregistered ten percent.

The core difficulty remains, the original treaty definition of a launching state was not built for an era of global supply chains, commercial launch providers, rideshare deployments, and multinational missions. Until States either agree on a more precise common understanding or update the legal framework entirely, definitional uncertainty will continue to contribute to inconsistent registration practices and gaps in the global registry.

Another challenge that contributes to the 10-12% gap is simply the pace at which commercial activity in outer space is growing^[16]. When the Space Age began, only a handful of governments had the capability to launch satellites. Today, private companies launch more satellites per year than governments ever did^[17]. Mega-constellations like SpaceX’s Starlink or Amazon’s Kuiper are sending hundreds or even thousands of satellites into orbit. This rapid commercial expansion puts pressure on national authorities who must keep track of every object launched under their jurisdiction. This raises the question of how these commercial operators fit within the existing legal framework.

National licensing regimes for launches, communication satellites, remote sensing focus on safety and national security. They are not directly tied to registration responsibilities. In some cases, a satellite may receive operating approvals from national regulators even before it is clear which State will ultimately register it. That is especially true for multinational companies that manufacture satellites in one country, register their corporate headquarters in another, and launch their missions from several different launch providers around the world.

When we combine all of this with the trend toward small satellites, university payloads, and rideshare missions, the result is a system that struggles to keep up with the number of new objects entering orbit. The Registration Convention, as written in 1976, was never designed to accommodate hundreds of small satellites launched at once, often with different owners and operators. This mismatch between technological capability and legal structure is one of the main reasons the ten percent gap is proving so difficult to close.

Even when space objects are registered, the story does not end there. The Registration Convention expects States to provide updates to the Secretary General of the UN whenever important information changes^[18]. In reality, many States provide only the initial launch data and never update the entry again^[19]. But satellites keep maneuvering, changing altitudes and sometimes they change their function entirely during their lifetime. A registry with outdated information can be almost as problematic as a registry missing entries altogether.

This issue becomes even more pronounced with large and mega-constellations. A constellation of thousands of satellites requires a constant flow of updated information about orbital parameters, deorbiting schedules, and replacement launches. If even one part of this system falls behind, the entire dataset becomes unreliable. Some countries simply do not have the administrative infrastructure to handle this kind of ongoing recordkeeping. Others rely heavily on the operators themselves to provide updates, which can lead to inconsistent or incomplete submissions.

However, the UNOOSA Toolkit recognizes this challenge. It encourages States to establish clear internal procedures, to coordinate between licensing and registry authorities, and to ensure that information is transmitted in a timely and standardized manner. While this is a step in the right direction, the Toolkit is not a binding instrument, it’s an addition to the soft law. Its effectiveness depends entirely on how seriously States choose to implement the recommendations.

There is also another, more sensitive reason for missing objects that I mentioned before; some States are reluctant to disclose full information about certain satellites, especially military ones. Many States place national security considerations above full transparency in their registry submissions. Although the Registration Convention does not contain a national security exception, in practice countries often choose to disclose only minimal information when registering a military payload, or in some cases delay registration until well after launch^[20].

This is understandable from the perspective of national security, but it complicates the broader system of transparency in outer space. Some classified missions may involve inspection satellites or technology demonstrations that states prefer to keep discreet. These missions may still be registered, but often with limited details. In cases where information is withheld or incomplete, it becomes difficult for other States to assess potential collision risks or understand the purpose of nearby objects in orbit.

National security secrecy is not new, but it becomes more significant as more actors operate in increasingly crowded orbits. Even an object that is properly registered can pose difficulties if its capabilities or movements are not disclosed. Some analysts suggest that national security concerns may contribute to non-registration. This tension between transparency and security is well known within COPUOS discussions^[21], but so far there has been no consensus on how to address it. As long as this tension exists, the registry will reflect not only administrative gaps but also deliberate omissions.

In conclusion, it must be noted that the sector is still expanding. Modern technology contributes to conflicts that arise from the definitions included in the Registration Convention^[22]. There is a need to find a universal way of registering space objects and implement it as an obligation, not soft-law. The recent UNOOSA Toolkit provides a great guide that may be used to harmonize the procedures that come from the international obligations.

^[1] “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.” Unoosa.org, 2024, www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html. Accessed 16 Jan. 2026.

^[2] JILP. “Houston, We Have a Problem: International Law’s Inability to Regulate Space Exploration – NYU JILP.” Nyujilp.org, 2 Jan. 2025, nyujilp.org/houston-we-have-a-problem-international-laws-inability-to-regulate-space-exploration/. Accessed 18 Jan. 2026.

^[3] “United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space.” Unoosa.org, 2024, www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html. Accessed 16 Jan. 2026.

^[4] UNOOSA. “Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects.” Unoosa.org, 2024, www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introliability-convention.html. Accessed 17 Dec. 2025.

^[5] Wright, Jack Nelson. “Lost in Space? Gaps in the International Space Object Registration Regime.” EJIL:Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 19 Nov. 2018. Accessed 15 Dec. 2025.

^[6] “United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space.” Unoosa.org, 2024, www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html. Accessed 16 Jan. 2026.

^[7] “Toolkit on Good Registration Practices for Objects Launched into Outer Space.” Unooosa.org, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 19 Nov. 2025, www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/oosadoc/data/documents/2025/stspace/stspace95_0.html. Accessed 15 Dec. 2025.

^[8] “Status of Treaties.” Unoosa.org, 2024, www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/status/index.html. Accessed 16 Jan. 2026.

^[9] “Toolkit on Good Registration Practices for Objects Launched into Outer Space.” Unooosa.org, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 19 Nov. 2025, www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/oosadoc/data/documents/2025/stspace/stspace95_0.html. Accessed 15 Dec. 2025.

^[10] “Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.” Unoosa.org, United Nations Officer for Outer Space Affairs, Nov. 2023. Accessed 15 Dec. 2025.

^[11] Lab, ISS National. “Student Teams Launch Fruit Flies, Fungus, and Futures on NASA’s SpaceX CRS-30.” ISS National Lab, 27 Apr. 2024, issnationallab.org/iss360/iss360-spxcrs30-higher-orbits/. Accessed 15 Dec. 2025.

^[12] “Governing Outer Space – Legal Issues Mounting at the Final Frontier.” DIIS, 16 Feb. 2023, www.diis.dk/en/research/governing-outer-space-legal-issues-mounting-the-final-frontier. Accessed 16 Jan. 2026.

^[13] dr hab. Anna Konert, prof. UŁa. “Commercial Outer Space Activities. Who Bears Civil Liability?” Https://Adastra.im.edu.pl/, Ad Astra PROGRAM BADAŃ NAD ASTROPOLITYKĄ I PRAWEM KOSMICZNYM, 2021, adastra.im.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Ad-Astra_Nr1_2021_Konert_artykul.pdf. Accessed 16 Jan. 2026.

^[14] “Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.” Unoosa.org, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2024, www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/registration-convention.html. Accessed 15 Dec. 2025.

^[15] uw.edu.pl. Cologne Commentary on Space Law (Volume II). Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, May 2014, research-1ebsco-1com-10000b5wh661a.han.buw.uw.edu.pl/c/nkhkbf/ebook-viewer/pdf/slibsgxlb5/page/pp_636?auth-callid=cebfccf6-bc42-431c-ae47-948d0bd011b2. Accessed 16 Jan. 2026.

^[16] “The Commercialisation of Outer Space: How an International Securities Framework Can Be the Launching Pad for a Global Space Economy.” Nortonrosefulbright.com, 2022, www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/102a426e/the-commercialisation-of-outer-space. Accessed 15 Dec. 2025.

^[17] Editor. “Study: Private Satellite Launches Exceed Government.” Advanced-Television.com, 18 July 2023, www.advanced-television.com/2023/07/18/study-private-satellite-launches-exceed-government/. Accessed 15 Dec. 2025.

^[18] “Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.” Unoosa.org, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2024, www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/registration-convention.html. Accessed 15 Dec. 2025.

^[19] “Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.” Unoosa.org, United Nations Officer for Outer Space Affairs, Nov. 2023. Accessed 15 Dec. 2025.

^[20] “Toolkit on Good Registration Practices for Objects Launched into Outer Space.” Unooosa.org, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 19 Nov. 2025, www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/oosadoc/data/documents/2025/stspace/stspace95_0.html. Accessed 15 Dec. 2025.

^[21] Jakhu, Ram S, et al. “Critical Issues Related to Registration of Space Objects and Transparency of Space Activities.” Acta Astronautica, vol. 143, 8 Dec. 2017, pp. 406–420, www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0094576517315138?utm, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actaastro.2017.11.042. Accessed 17 Jan. 2026.

^[22] “Technology and the Unique Challenges of Applying Law to the Realm of Outer Space and Space Activities | Chicago Journal of International Law.” Uchicago.edu, 2025, cjil.uchicago.edu/print-archive/technology-and-unique-challenges-applying-law-realm-outer-space-and-space-activities. Accessed 18 Jan. 2026.