On March 2, 2026, the National Security and Military Law Society hosted Emory Law Professor Mary L. Dudziak for a discussion of her forthcoming book, Going to War: An American History The event examined a central question in constitutional and national security law: what has happened to the expectation that presidents seek meaningful congressional authorization before using military force?
Drawing on her research, Professor Dudziak argued that legal and political restraints on U.S. war-making have eroded over time, producing what she describes as an era of “forever war.” Rather than focusing narrowly on doctrine, she encouraged a broader perspective—one that examines how constitutional norms surrounding war powers have shifted historically and become embedded in political practice.
She began by questioning whether the United States can meaningfully distinguish between wartime and peacetime. Traditional legal frameworks assume a linear progression between the two, with wartime justifying expanded government power and peacetime restoring ordinary constraints. But that model depends on war having a clear beginning and end. If the nation never fully returns to peace, the distinction itself becomes unstable.
Professor Dudziak suggested that wartime and peacetime are best understood as forms of “social time,” shaped by political and legal narratives rather than objective conditions. Looking across U.S. history, she noted that military engagement has been nearly continuous. Using campaign service medals as a proxy for conflict, she observed that there are remarkably few years that can truly be described as peacetime. This persistent state of conflict complicates the assumption that wartime is temporary and exceptional.
She also emphasized that war is not simply experienced—it is framed. Political actors and institutions shape how conflicts are understood, and those narratives carry legal consequences. In the aftermath of September 11, for example, President George W. Bush successfully framed the attacks as war, establishing a framework that justified expanded executive power. Similarly, she noted that President Franklin D. Roosevelt loosened wartime censorship rules during World War II to allow publication of images of fallen American soldiers, deliberately shaping public perception to deepen civilian engagement with the war effort. In this way, the concept of wartime does not just describe events; it helps construct them.
Distance further shapes public understanding. Because American wars are typically fought abroad, civilians experience them indirectly, often through curated media. This distance can weaken democratic engagement and reduce the political pressure that might otherwise constrain the use of force.
Professor Dudziak identified the Korean War as a critical turning point. President Truman deployed U.S. forces without seeking a congressional declaration of war, instead characterizing the conflict as a “police action.” Over time, that decision became a key precedent for unilateral presidential uses of force. Executive branch lawyers have relied on Korea to argue that congressional authorization is unnecessary for conflicts deemed smaller in scale, a position that has significantly diminished Congress’s practical role in war-making.
At the same time, she noted that legal interpretation within the executive branch has played a central role in expanding presidential authority, particularly through Office of Legal Counsel opinions. Even when Congress has attempted to impose limits, those efforts have been narrowed in practice. Still, lawyers within the executive branch can serve as important internal checks, particularly when they resist overly expansive assertions of power.
In discussion, students raised questions about coalition warfare, media fragmentation, and the role of public opinion. Professor Dudziak emphasized that international authorization does not alter the Constitution’s allocation of war powers and pointed to the Vietnam War era as evidence that public pressure can meaningfully shape military policy, even if not always through formal legal channels.
Ultimately, the event underscored that constitutional limits on war-making depend not only on legal doctrine but also on political engagement and historical understanding. Professor Dudziak’s forthcoming book situates today’s “forever war” within a longer trajectory, challenging assumptions about war, peace, and the role of law in constraining executive power.